Standard principal-agent theory is generally based on gross performance measures (i.e., before compensation expense), yet boards in practice also determine incentive compensation using net performance measures (i.e., after deducting compensation expense). In a multi-principal, multi-agent model where relative performance evaluation arises endogenously, we derive theoretically optimal incentive weights based on net performance and show that they yield substantially different economic determinants relative to incentive weights based on gross performance. Extending our model to an empirical context, we then show analytically that the conventional practice of including net performance in compensation regressions creates a bias in estimating pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS). However, including gross performance yields an unbiased estimate of PPS irrespective of whether boards actually determine managerial compensation using net or gross performance. We provide empirical evidence of underestimated PPS when including net (relative to gross) performance in compensation regressions, suggesting a possible explanation for surprisingly weak CEO incentives interpreted in prior studies. Applying our insights to tests for relative performance evaluation, we also investigate biases created by using net versus gross performance.
INTRODUCTION
Principal-agent theory generally assumes the agent is compensated based on performance measures that do not reflect the compensation payment. 1 In the context of financial performance, the theory implies, for example, that accounting returns are measured before compensation expense (i.e., a gross performance measure). 2 In an executive compensation study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) explicitly acknowledge the potential for an inconsistency between principal-agent theory and empirical analysis. They assert that to be consistent with theory and to avoid introducing a measurement bias into the empirical analysis, performance should be measured before compensation. Despite their assertion, in their empirical analysis Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure performance after compensation, arguing that the associated bias would be small because CEO pay changes are tiny relative to changes in firm value. 3 Additionally, it could be argued that a discrepancy between theory and empirical analysis might not matter because industry-adjusted gross and net performance are so highly correlated that use of either performance measure would leave empirical inferences unchanged.
This study investigates three questions arising from the use of net performance measures in a multi-firm moral-hazard setting with correlated firm performance, where the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) arises endogenously. First, are optimal managerial incentive rates using net performance any different to incentive rates under existing principal-agent theory using gross performance? 4 Second, controlling for scaling effects, is the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in an empirical-archival compensation setting more sensitive to gross performance than to net performance? Third, do conventionally-observed tests for RPE hold, when using net instead of gross performance? Overall, our objective is to understand the effects of a mismatch between theoretical insights based on gross (net) performance and empirical analysis based on net (gross) performance.
We proceed in four main steps. First, in a multi-principal and multi-agent setting, we theoretically derive incentive rates based on net firm and net peer performance, which we then compare to standard "benchmark"
incentive rates based on gross firm and gross peer performance. Second, applying the theoretical comparisons to an empirical-archival compensation context, we analytically study whether pay-for-performance sensitivities differ systematically when an empirical researcher uses either net or gross performance. Third, we document descriptive evidence demonstrating the magnitude of executive compensation relative to net income and then compare pay-forperformance sensitivities from separate regressions, where performance is defined (i) net of compensation and (ii) gross of compensation (e.g., CEO compensation is added back to the accounting performance variable). Finally, complementing standard theoretical intuition for gross performance, we derive an implicit empirical test for RPE from theory based on net performance (e.g., Janakiraman et al. 1992 ). This provides a theoretical basis for interpreting prior empirical studies that all make use of net performance measures.
We find that the optimal managerial incentive rates using net versus gross performance measures differ substantially in their economic determinants and in how they induce total effort incentives. In contrast to the case of gross performance, an agent can influence his peer's net performance because the peer's net performance includes the peer agent's compensation, which is correlated with the focal agent's controllable performance. The degree of controllability of the peer's net performance increases with the correlation between firm and peer performance, enabling the principal in settings of high positive correlation to induce effort with a lower incentive rate based on the focal firm's net performance as compared to the incentive rate based on the focal firm's gross performance.
However, in terms of net payoff to the principal, total compensation and total effort incentives offered to the agent, the outcomes are identical irrespective of whether contracts are based on gross or net performance measures.
Intuitively, the principal has the same information to motivate her agent with gross and net performance.
In an empirical context, one might assume that researchers can mitigate measurement bias in estimating total effort incentives by ensuring consistency between the performance measures actually used in compensation contracts and the empirical operationalization of performance (i.e., net with net or gross with gross). Surprisingly, however, our theoretical analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) suggests that empirical researchers will best estimate total effort incentives by including gross performance (i.e., adding compensation back to net performance) in the compensation regression and controlling for gross peer-group performance irrespective of whether actual managerial compensation is based on net or gross performance. Failure to do so implies that the estimated PPS can be biased downwards. This suggests a theoretical rationale for empirical observations that managerial effort incentives are rather weak (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990 ).
Our empirical evidence generally supports our claim that it matters whether performance is measured net or gross of compensation. Using Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP data, we document that compensation is a material component of net income. On average, CEO compensation comprises 2.3% (median 2.3%) of net income and the collective compensation of the Top 5 executives comprises 11.1% (median 6.7%). 5 Based on compensation regressions, we present evidence that the PPS coefficient on net performance is smaller than the corresponding coefficient on gross performance, despite net performance being smaller than the gross performance variable.
Controlling for industry-size defined net peer-group performance, a one-standard deviation increase in net performance is associated with a $130,000 increase in CEO compensation. Replacing net with gross performance (e.g., by adding back Top 5 executive compensation) implies that a one-standard deviation increase in performance is associated with a $505,000 increase in compensation. Accordingly, this empirically supports our theoretical prediction that researchers' use of net performance may lead to the surprisingly weak effort incentives for CEOs interpreted in earlier work (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . We conduct further empirical analyses to support our claim that it matters whether an empirical researcher measures performance gross or net. For example, we predict and find evidence that when excluding an empirical control for peer-group performance, the coefficient on either gross or net performance will be larger for settings with low correlation between focal firm and peer-group performance than in settings with a high correlation.
Finally, we show that implicit RPE tests differ substantially depending on the researcher's use of gross or net performance. A "strong" implication of RPE is that peer-related risk is eliminated from compensation (e.g., Antle
and Smith 1986). Statistically, a researcher finds evidence for the strong-form RPE hypothesis if the estimated regression coefficient on gross peer performance is not statistically different from zero (Janakiraman et al. 1992 ).
We show, in contrast, that a researcher finds evidence for strong-form RPE if the estimated regression coefficient on net peer performance is not significantly different from a benchmark that depends on characteristics of the economy (i.e., focal and peer firm characteristics). This result and our empirical finding that compensation is a material component of net income suggest a potential rationale for mixed strong-form RPE evidence in prior empirical studies, which all are based on net performance (e.g., Dikolli et al. 2011 , Table 1 ).
6,7
5 These percentages potentially understate the effect. Ideally, if compensation based on gross performance is to be used for empirical tests, in theory all of the compensation should be added back to performance. As an example of how researchers can access further compensation information, under IAS24 compensation expense must be disclosed for all key management personnel whether or not they are in the Top 5 highest paid executives. 6 For example, using net peer performance in the empirical part of their study, Janakiraman et al. (1992) observe on average a positive regression coefficient on peer performance. They interpret this result as evidence against the strong-form RPE hypothesis. Our result for net performance suggests that a non-zero test benchmark is applicable. Accordingly, in contrast to the interpretation in Janakiraman et al. (1992) , a significantly positive regression coefficient on net peer performance does not rule out the possibility of strong-form RPE.
Our study has the following empirical implications. First, if an empirical researcher is interested in studying the economic determinants of incentive rates (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick 1999) , our analysis suggests it is important to understand whether actual managerial compensation is based on net or gross performance, because theoretically they have different determinants. Second, if an empirical researcher is interested in studying the relation between pay and performance (e.g., to obtain an unbiased estimate of managerial effort incentives as in Jensen and Murphy 1990) , our analysis suggests that it is unnecessary to understand whether actual compensation is based on net or gross performance. This is because empirical researchers can generate an unbiased estimate of total effort incentives by including in a compensation regression the gross performance (i.e., adding compensation back to net performance) and controlling for gross peer-group performance irrespective of whether the actual managerial compensation is based on net or gross performance. Third, our theoretical analysis suggests that testing for strongform RPE is best achieved using gross performance measures irrespective of whether actual compensation is based on net or gross performance. The reason is that with gross performance the benchmark for inferring RPE is independent of characteristics of the economy, which is not the case for net performance.
This study is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we describe our basic setup. In Section 3, we derive a unique equilibrium for optimal contracts based on net performance. In Section 4, we derive analytically specific empirical implications. We present empirical evidence in Section 5 and demonstrate how our theoretical insights map into the empirical-archival data. In Section 6 we extend our empirical implications to tests of relative performance evaluation. In Section 7 we conclude.
THE MODEL

Agents' effort, performance measures, and incentive schemes
Prior studies model the design of incentive contracts for piece-rate settings, however, these contracts could be also interpreted as being based on financial performance before the payment of compensation expense (i.e., gross performance, e.g., Holmström 1979, Banker and Datar 1989) . To the extent that executive compensation contracts in practice are applied based on net performance measures after compensation expense (e.g., accounting or stock returns), there is a gap between theory and executive compensation design in practice. 8 Applying a multi-principal,
THEORETICAL RESULTS
Compensation based on net performance
Returning to the analysis of net performance, one might conjecture that the solution for net performance is equivalent to the solution for gross performance in terms of the induced total effort, the agents' expected compensation, and the principals' expected net payoff. Intuitively, each principal uses the same information to motivate her agent with gross and net performance. From an ex post perspective, the net performance measures,
, are an equivalent statistic to the gross performance measures, , given the agents' compensation, . However, from an ex ante perspective, the agents' compensation is determined as an equilibrium in the principals' sub-games. Under gross performance the agents' incentive rates are independent, while as a result of relative performance evaluation the incentive rates are interrelated under net performance.
Intuitively, an agent's net peer performance depends on the peer agent's compensation (and vice versa). Hence, the principals' sub-games differ significantly. Nevertheless, in Lemma 1, we confirm the above conjecture.
To elaborate, the agents simultaneously choose their effort to maximize their certainty equivalent at date 
Technically, given the contracts, , the agents' actions constitute a unique dominant strategy.
Solving for and substituting in principal i's net payoff, and simplifying yields the following characterization of principal decision problem from (4):
where is given by (10). The constraint reflects that, in equilibrium, the fixed salary is chosen so that agent individual rationality constraint is satisfied. Agent i's incentive compatibility constraints, (6) and (10), differ substantially between gross and net performance, yielding strikingly different decision problems for the principals. Differentiating (11) with respect to and and solving the first-order conditions yields the following reaction functions for principal i's choice of incentive rates, and .
For principal i, the incentive rates depend on the conjectured incentive rates of the other principal. In equilibrium, conjectures are correct. Solving the system of equations (12) yields the characterization of the optimal equilibrium contracts. Lemma 1 summarizes the incentive rates and confirms our intuition that, under both performance measures, the equilibrium outcome is equivalent in terms of the induced total efforts, the agents' expected compensation, and the principals' expected net payoff. 
the fixed salary, , is determined such that agent i's individual rationality constraint is satisfied, and the induced 13 Although determining the incentive rates and fixed salaries as a direct solution of the following system of equations, for , provides the same solution as in Lemma 1, it is unclear from this "shortcut" whether the solution indeed constitutes an equilibrium in the principals' sub-game (as outlined in expression (12)). In fact, the principals' reaction functions (expressions (7) and (12)) and the agents' incentive compatibility constraints (expressions (6) and (10)) differ significantly. Hence, applying this shortcut leaves both the determinants of the principals' contract choice and the agents' action choice opaque. (ii) The optimal incentive rate for firm i's gross performance exceeds the optimal incentive rate for net performance for high correlations (and vice versa), i.e., iff . Proposition 1 (i) shows a positive relation between the focal firm's incentive rates for net and gross performance. Thus, comparative statics for (e.g., Lambert 2001) also apply for . 14 Proposition 1 (i) further suggests an interesting relation between the incentive rate for focal-firm net performance and the incentive rate for peer-firm gross performance. Stronger peer-firm effort incentives, , yield a larger incentive rate for firm i's net performance, . A concern is that pay benchmarking has increased the compensation within an industry ("Lake Wobegon" effect; Hayes and Schaefer 2009); alternatively, our result suggests a mechanical relation between peerfirms' effort incentives and a focal firm's incentive rate for net performance.
14 For a detailed discussion see Appendix B. 
Motivated by applied studies on managerial effort incentives (Murphy 1985 , Jensen and Murphy 1990 , Hall and Liebman 1998 , Proposition 1 (ii) addresses the extent to which the incentive rate for firm i's net performance, , captures a manager's effort incentives. With gross performance, total effort incentives are proportional to the incentive rate for firm i's gross performance, (see expression (6)). In contrast, with net performance total effort incentives depend on both agents' incentive rates, , , , and (see expression (10)). In equilibrium, however, the induced effort is identical when contracts are based on either gross or net performance (compare Observation 1 and Lemma 1).
One might suspect that the focal firm's incentive rate based on net performance exceeds its rate on gross performance since the focal firm's expected gross performance exceeds its expected net performance. Proposition 1
(ii) shows that while this conjecture holds for low correlations between firm and peer performance, surprisingly, for high correlations a larger incentive rate is necessary on gross versus net performance. The reason is as follows.
Rearranging expression (14), , highlights that under net performance, agent i's total effort incentives are proportional to two terms. The first term, , follows from contracting on own net performance and amounts to simple scaling; as conjectured: if . The second term follows from contracting on the other firm's net performance and decreases in the correlation, . Intuitively, the degree of controllability of the peer's net performance increases with the correlation, enabling the principal to induce effort with a lower incentive rate for own net performance. For high correlations, the controllability effect dominates the scaling effect implying that the optimal incentive rate for the focal firm's net performance is below the optimal incentive rate for the focal firm's gross performance (which, in turn, is proportional to total effort incentives).
Overall, the incentive rates for the focal firm's net and gross performance differ regarding the extent to which they capture managerial effort incentives. We next discuss how this affects empirical estimates of managerial effort incentives.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDIES ON PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY (PPS)
Research studies that investigate pay-for-performance sensitivity are well established in the literature (e.g., Murphy 1985 , Jensen and Murphy 1990 , Ittner et al. 1997 , Cadman et al. 2010 . In many of these studies, when accounting-based performance measures are included as explanatory variables in the regressions, the researcher † ii
considers accounting returns after compensation expense (i.e., a net performance measure). 15 To the extent that executive compensation contracts in practice are applied based on net performance measures, empirical research design choices can be characterized as being consistent with empirically-observed practice (i.e., net with net).
16
Based on agency settings with gross performance, however, a key prediction is that the sensitivity of pay to performance (pay-performance-sensitivity, PPS) equals the incentive rate on a manager's own gross performance, , thereby identifying total managerial effort incentives (Murphy 1999) . A puzzling observation from empirical studies is that the estimated PPSs are relatively low, suggesting that executive managers' effort incentives are surprisingly weak (Jensen and Murphy 1990) . 17 Commentators argue that it is difficult to assess whether incentives are set too low, since key factors of effort incentives (e.g., risk aversion or sensitivity of performance to effort) are unobserved (Prendergast 1999, Demski and Sappington 1999) .
18
In this section we provide another potential rationale by showing that the estimated PPS is biased away from a manager's effort incentives when either net performance is used or when there is no control for peer performance.
In fact, to obtain an unbiased estimate of a manager's effort incentives, we find that the regression analysis needs to use gross performance and control for gross peer performance. However, empirical compensation studies on managerial effort incentives typically use measures based on net firm performance such as stock price or accounting earnings (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990 , Core et al. 2003 , Cadman et al. 2010 . 19 To illustrate the consequences of using net rather than gross performance, we study PPS estimates when empirical studies do not control for peer 15 Additionally, in using stock returns as a performance measure, a researcher implicitly incorporates the effect of the compensation paid to executives during the year. Core et al. (2003) document evidence that price-based incentives provided by the CEO's equity portfolio are economically larger than the flow compensation incentives based on non-price factors that we discuss in this paper. It is possible that investors add back compensation to performance and consider the CEO's equity portfolio in valuing the firm's equity, however, there is no direct evidence to support such a claim. Notwithstanding, our study has implications for the substantial body of compensation studies where a researcher isolates a flow compensation measure as the dependent variable and includes performance-based explanatory variables. Recent examples include Murphy and Sandino (2010) , Cadman et al. (2010) , Graham et al. (2011) , and Morse et al. (2011) . 16 It is difficult to determine whether compensation contract parameters are systematically linked to financial performance before or after the payment of compensation. For example, Eichen and Scoones (2002) claim that the most common structure for linking performance measures to an annual incentive plan is through an additive approach, where a total pay opportunity is established and paid if multiple performance measure targets are met. It is not clear, however, from practitioner-based literature to what extent targets related to financial performance are calculated before or after the pre-determined target opportunity (e.g., Overton and Stoffer 2008, Balsam 2002) . See Appendix C for examples of publicly-observable executive employment agreements.
17 Jensen and Murphy (1990) claim that the relatively low pay-for-performance sensitivity (even after including an estimation of portfolio wealth) raises a question of whether CEOs are paid like bureaucrats. Hall and Liebman (1998) disagree with the claim, suggesting that even a small pay-for-performance sensitivity for very large firms yields a significant wealth effect and thus strong incentives.
18 Others suggest that PPS is influenced by firm size and therefore argue that pay-performance semi-elasticity (i.e., PPSE, obtained from a regression of natural logarithm of compensation on rates of return) is more appropriate (Hall and Liebman 1998; Baker and Hall 2004) . 19 In contrast to prior studies of the determinants of the level of executive compensation (e.g., Craighead et al. 2004 , Graham et al. 2011 , we explicitly allow for the possibility that a manager's compensation can be based on RPE. † ii v performance (Section 4.1) and when empirical studies control for peer performance (Section 4.2). These analyses allow us to generate hypotheses about the consequences of using net rather than gross performance (Section 4.3).
We test these hypotheses in Section 5.
A comparison of PPS based on net versus gross performance
To examine the relation between managerial compensation and firm performance, assuming that there is no control for peer performance, empirical studies typically estimate the PPS of manager i as the regression coefficient of the following regression ,
where " " is given by the observed compensation of manager i, denotes the intercept, " " denotes firm i's performance in the regression, and represents an uncorrelated error term.
The left-hand side of regression (15) is given by the firm's choice to base managerial compensation on either net or gross performance, or , while the right-hand side is given by the empirical researcher's choice of net or gross firm performance, or .
We first consider that the researcher uses gross firm performance in regression (15), i.e.,
. The estimated regression coefficient when managerial compensation is based on net performance and the researcher uses gross firm performance is given by 20 ,
and the estimated regression coefficient when managerial compensation is based on gross performance is given by .
The regression coefficients are identical. Intuitively, Lemma 1 (ii) ensures that the observed compensation of manager i is identical under net and gross performance, , implying that the left-hand side of regression (15) is not influenced by the firm's choice to base managerial compensation on either net or gross performance.
Consequently, the researcher's estimate of PPS is not affected by whether managerial compensation is based on either net or gross performance, .
The result in (16a) and (16b) can be explained by two extreme cases. If the performance measures are 20 We summarize estimated regression coefficients in Proposition 2 and provide proofs in Appendix A.
, we obtain the result that equals the incentive rate, i.e., the estimated PPS yields an unbiased estimate of the manager's effort incentives (Murphy 1998) . However, if the performance measures are perfectly correlated, , the principal perfectly filters risk from the agent's compensation, implying a deterministic compensation. Accordingly, the regression coefficient is zero. Expressions (16a) and (16b) imply a non-monotonic relation between and . For example, effort incentives are maximal for perfect correlation,
, while the estimated PPS is minimal . Before we discuss implications of this important result more in detail, we consider the case with net performance.
Consistent with prior empirical compensation studies, we next consider that the researcher uses net firm performance in regression (15), i.e., . Since Lemma 1 (ii) ensures that the observed managerial compensation is identical under net and gross performance, , the researcher's estimate of PPS is not affected by whether managerial compensation is based on either net, , or gross performance, , allowing us to express the associated estimated regression coefficient in terms of :
The impact of net performance is twofold: First, is adjusted by the ratio of the variance of manager i's compensation relative to the variance of firm i's gross performance, i.e., . 21 Second, is scaled by the ratio of the variance of firm i's gross performance relative to firm i's net performance, . Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the estimated PPS with gross performance, , and with net performance, , and total effort incentives, , for varying correlations, (with ).
---Insert Figure 1 About Here. ---While total effort incentives are strictly increasing in , approaching one for , in stark contrast, the two estimates for PPS are strictly decreasing in , approaching zero for . For , the estimate for PPS with net performance strictly exceeds the estimate for PPS with gross performance, which equals the incentive rate. For any correlation, the estimated PPS with gross performance is below the incentive rate. In contrast, the PPS with net performance exceeds the incentive rate as well as the PPS with gross performance for low correlations; this relation 21 Note ensures .
reverses for high correlations. Before we outline implications for empirical compensation studies, we summarize our results: 
An unbiased PPS estimate for total effort incentives
We next investigate how the control for peer performance alters the empiricist's estimate of managerial effort incentives. Formally, the researcher estimates the PPS as the regression coefficient of the following regression while controlling for peer performance, ,
where " " is firm i's peer performance and is the associated regression coefficient.
When the researcher uses net measures of firm performance, regression (18) is given by . Since the observed managerial compensation is identical under net and gross performance, , the researcher's estimate of PPS is not affected by whether managerial compensation is based on either net, , or gross performance, . When controlling for peer performance, the associated estimated regression coefficients follow as .
Recall, while total effort incentives are identical when managerial compensation is based on either net or gross performance, under net performance some of the effort incentives come from contracting on the performance of peer firms. Thus, except for knife edge cases, the estimated PPS differs from total effort incentives, † 2ˆˆ( 1 )
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Hypotheses
To study empirically the consequences of using net rather than gross performance measures in more detail, our previous results (e.g., from Figure 1 ) suggest the following hypotheses, which we empirically test in Section 5.
Hypotheses:
In an empirical investigation of managerial effort incentives: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The purpose of this section is to test directly the hypothesis specified above. Doing so provides support for the view that it matters to the interpretation of the regressions if performance is measured net versus gross of compensation. We base our empirical specification on a commonly-used flow-compensation regression in the executive compensation literature. While total CEO incentives are often driven by changes in CEO portfolio wealth (Core and Guay 2002) , we focus our empirical analysis on flow compensation because we seek to generate implications for a large literature that specifically addresses pay-for-performance sensitivity in a controllability context (e.g., Murphy and Sandino 2010; Cadman et al. 2010; Graham et al. 2011; Morse et al. 2011 ).
We proceed as follows. First, we present descriptive statistics that provides evidence of the magnitude of CEO compensation relative to net accounting performance. Second, we present a comparison of estimates for CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities when a researcher measures performance net of compensation versus gross of compensation.
Data
For fiscal years 1993 to 2008, we obtain compensation and CEO characteristics data (including starting year and age) from Execucomp, and financial and returns data from Compustat/CRSP. We supplement these sources, where necessary, with handcollected data from other public sources. We include as a control variable in our regressions whether the CEO is a founder and thus also access the Field-Ritter dataset of company founding dates (Field and Karpoff 2002, Loughran and Ritter 2004 
Unlike several other compensation studies, we focus primarily on accounting-based performance measures to identify pay-for-performance sensitivity, rather than stock returns. 25 We do, however, include as controls in our regressions two years of lagged performance variables, both stock returns and accounting-based returns. In later sensitivity checks, we also adjust stock returns to define an approximation of returns before compensation.
To remove the likely presence in our sample of observations with undue influence, we truncate at the 1 st and 99 th percentile of accounting rate of return. 26 Our final sample for the pay-for-performance regressions is 15,340
firm-year observations, comprising 2,347 unique firms and 3,799 unique CEOs.
Descriptive evidence
In Table 1 , we present descriptive statistics for our dataset, including the distribution of accounting rates of return, our main performance variable of interest. The average accounting rate of return based on shareholder's equity (accrorN) for the sample is 9%. When accrorN is adjusted to exclude CEO compensation, the gross accounting rate of return (accrorG) increases to 9.7%. When accrorN is adjusted to exclude the Top 5 executives' compensation, accrorT increases to 10.9%. The changes to accrorN by adjusting compensation appear to be material in that, for example, a 20% change in accounting rate of return occurs when adding back Top 5 executives' compensation.
To capture the effect of the CEO compensation adjustment further, we calculate impact which represents the effect of CEO compensation as a percentage of accounting rate of return, scaled also by shareholder's equity (seq).
The average impact implies that CEO compensation on average comprises 2.3% of net income. The range of impact is -551.987 to 129.876. 27 While the impact measure suggests that accounting returns is unlikely to be substantially affected by excluding CEO compensation, we take a conservative approach and still investigate the subsequent effects on compensation regressions. We also calculate impactT5 which represents the effect of Top 5 executives' compensation as a percentage of accounting rate of return, scaled by shareholder's equity. The average impactT5 value of 11.1% of net income is larger than impact though it is more skewed than impact. The median impactT5 is 6.7% of net income.
The remaining variables in Table 1 present descriptive statistics of commonly-used economic determinants of 25 Other studies measure the role of accounting in compensation design other than as a performance variable. For example, Carter et al. (2007) use principal-component analysis to generate variables that proxy for concerns about financial reporting and show that these variables are significantly associated with the value of newly granted stock options and the CEO's total flow compensation. 26 Our inferences are unchanged if we do not truncate at the 1st percentile but our results weaken without truncation at the 99th percentile.
Results are unchanged if we instead winsorize at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
27 It is possible for the impact calculation to be a large negative number because a firm may make losses and the CEO still receives a relatively high level of pay.
the level of CEO compensation including lagged values of firm size (ln_mve_1), growth opportunities (tobinsq_1), and both lagged stock returns and accounting performance (mktror_i, and accror_i, i = 1, 2). Other control variables include returns volatility (sdret), CEO tenure (lntenure), CEO age (startage), whether the CEO was an outside hire (outside), and whether the CEO was a founder or co-founder of the company (founder). Each of the control variables exhibits distributional characteristics consistent with that found in other studies spanning similar time periods (e.g., Black et al. 2011 , Albuquerque 2009 , Gong et al. 2011 ).
Test of H1: Differences in coefficients on gross vs net performance
H1 predicts that the estimates of PPS will differ depending on whether net or gross performance is used as an independent variable in the compensation regression. In fact, for sufficiently high correlations of the focal firm's performance with peer-group performance, the PPS based on gross performance, , is larger than the PPS on net performance, (see Figure 1) . This is because, in theory, the principal considers that net peer-group performance is (partially) controllable and therefore contracting on net peer-group performance provides effort incentives.
To examine CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities for annual flow compensation, the base empirical model is: 28, 29 where is the natural logarithm of level CEO flow compensation for firm i in year t, is net income divided by shareholder's equity for firm i in period t, and is a vector of j control variables, as identified in the Section 5.2. We repeat the regression but with accrorN replaced by accrorG and then by accrorT.
Of interest is a comparison of the PPS, as captured by the relevant coefficients in each regression respectively.
Results are reported in Table 2 . In the first three columns we report, respectively, the results of the base regression without including controls, to isolate a fundamental difference between the pay-for-performance sensitivities. A comparison in Columns 1 and 2 of the coefficients on accounting returns indicates that the pay-forperformance sensitivity is larger when compensation is excluded from the definition of accounting returns. The coefficient increases further in Column 3 when compensation for the Top 5 executives is excluded from performance. Despite the average value of the accrorG variable being larger than the average value of accrorN (see 28 Consistent with other studies of determinants of compensation levels (e.g., Carter et al. 2007 , Graham et al. 2011 , we use the natural logarithm of total compensation as the dependent variable because variation in rates of return typically yield higher levels of explanatory power for the variation of the natural logarithm of total compensation than for the variation of raw total compensation (Murphy 1999) . In later sensitivity checks, we show that our inferences are unchanged if we use raw total compensation as the dependent variable in our regressions.
29 While the analysis in the prior section assumes firm-specific regression specifications, consistent with prior work we conduct a crosssectional empirical analysis assuming time trends and pay-performance relations across executives to be constant and including firmspecific characteristics and fixed effects as controls (e.g., Murphy 1999). Table 1 ), the regression coefficient on accrorG is on average also larger than the coefficient on accrorN.
A similar chain of results hold for accrorT. Additionally, when comparing coefficients on accrorN and either accrorG or accrorT the difference in the magnitude of these coefficients is statistically significant (p<.001). Further, the explanatory power (adjusted R 2 ) of the regression based on either type of gross performance is larger than the regression based on net performance (3.25% or 3.22% versus 2.7%) though the explanatory power of the regression when Top 5 compensation is excluded is not higher than the explanatory power of the regression when only CEO compensation is excluded.
Taken together, these results suggest (1) support for H1 that the coefficients are statistically significantly different and (2) that on average in our sample, the effects of the subsample of highly correlated focal and peer performance tend to dominate the effects of the subsample of firms with relatively low correlation between focal and peer firm performance. This latter result is due to the coefficient on a gross performance variable being consistently larger than the coefficient on net performance.
In Columns 4 to 6, we include control variables and observe a similar pattern in the variables of interest. The coefficient increases from 0.305 to 0.491 to 0.600 after excluding first CEO compensation and then Top 5 executive compensation from the accounting rate of return. The magnitude differences are statistically significant (p<.001).
The adjusted R 2 of the regression based on gross performance with controls is also slightly larger each time more compensation is excluded (i.e., the adjusted R 2 increases from 42.4% to 42.7% to 43%).
In summary, our characterization of the estimated PPS in Section 4 suggests that applying net performance in compensation regressions may introduce unnecessary measurement error. If the correlation between a firm and peer performance is relatively large, it is likely that a PPS coefficient based on net performance will be understated. Table 2 demonstrate the importance in compensation regressions of considering the measurement of accounting performance before (i.e., gross of) compensation.
Consistent with this characterization, the results in
Tests of H2 and H3: Differences in high and low correlation subsamples
This sub-section investigates whether the empirical evidence supports our Hypotheses H2 and H3. We examine each test in turn. Before doing so, we must determine high and low correlation settings. We proceed as follows. First, we define peer-group performance using industry-size quartiles (Albuquerque, 2009 ) for the universe of Compustat firms. Because of the high risk of outlier accounting rates of return in an industry-size quartile unduly affecting the computed peer-group performance, we take the median (instead of mean) of peer-group performance within an industry-size quartile. For each observation with non-missing data, we then find the median peer-group net performance for each applicable industry-size quartile (PMedianN). We next add back CEO compensation to peer-group performance and then applying the same industry-size quartiles defined in the larger Compustat sample, we find the median peer-group gross performance (PMedianG). We perform a similar procedure in adding back Top 5 executive compensation to the peer-group performance for each observation to compute PMedianT.
To define high and low correlation of focal-firm and peer-group performance, we run firm-specific regressions of focal-firm performance (accrorI, I = N, G, T, respectively) on corresponding peer-group performance (PMedianI, I=N, G, T) for each unique firm. 30 From each regression, a correlation coefficient above the median defines the observation as a high correlation setting; whereas a correlation coefficient below the median defines the observation as a low correlation setting. We now proceed to our test of Hypothesis H2.
In settings with a low correlation of the focal firm's performance with peer-group performance, H2 predicts the estimated PPS coefficient (i.e., either or from Figure 1 ) to be greater than the corresponding estimated PPS coefficient in settings with high correlation. Results of the test of H2 are reported in Table 3 . We first observe the coefficient on focal-firm performance is positive and significant for each specification, as expected. Next, in testing H2, the PPS coefficient in the low correlation setting (columns 1-3) is always greater than the corresponding coefficient in the high correlation setting (columns 4-6, respectively), with each difference being statistically significant (p<.001). This supports H2, which predicts differences in the high and low correlation subsamples.
Hypothesis H3 suggests that for firms having a high (low) correlation with the performance of their peer group, the estimated PPS based on net firm performance is below (above) the estimated PPS based on gross firm performance. Results in Table 3 provide mixed support for H3. In the case of high correlation, we find strong support for H3 in that the coefficient on net performance (0.499) is statistically significantly (at p<.001) below that of gross performance (0.696 for accrorG and 0.796 for accrorT, respectively). However, in the case of low correlation, our results show a similar pattern (i.e., coefficient on accrorN < coefficient on either accrorG or accrorT) contrary to the H3 prediction. A possible explanation for lack of support for H3 in the case of the low correlation subsample is that the cutoff in defining low correlation is improperly defined. While H3 provides a basis for testing whether the coefficients are different from each other, it does not suggest the appropriate level at which to define the cutoff for low correlation. 30 We require a minimum of four observations of either the focal-firm performance or the industry-size defined peer-group performance. For the analysis in this sub-section our sample size drops by up to 43% because of (1) the restriction of at least four observations per firmspecific regression, and (2) missing peer-group CEO and Top 5 executive compensation data.
Tests of H4 and H5: Controlling for peer-group performance
Hypothesis H4 is similar to H1 in that it predicts settings in which PPS estimates based on gross performance are larger than PPS estimates based on net performance, holding all else constant. The difference in H4 is that the regression includes a control for peer performance. One test of this hypothesis is to add back compensation and if
we observe an increasing weight on the performance measure, we will have found support for H4.
Results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficients on Perf (0.384 and 0.856, respectively) in columns (1) and (2) are statistically significantly different (p<.001) from each other. The same inference applies when comparing the coefficients on Perf (0.384 and 1.107, respectively) in columns (1) and (3). Moreover, the direction of the coefficient differences supports H4 -there exists a larger coefficient on gross performance, despite the gross performance measure being larger than net performance for every observation in our sample. We interpret these results as providing support for H4.
We next turn to H5. An important implication from Section 4.2 is that when a researcher controls for peergroup performance, the estimated PPS reflects total effort incentives that the regression aims to estimate. In particular, equation (20) demonstrates that a PPS based on gross performance with a corresponding control for gross peer-group performance yields an unbiased estimate of the incentive rate based on gross performance and, in turn, total effort incentives. An empirical test of this result reflects a test of H5, i.e., if this result holds empirically, the PPS based on gross performance will be larger in size than the corresponding coefficient when a control for gross performance is excluded (i.e., compare with in Figure 1 ).
Results for the full sample are reported in a comparison of coefficients on Perf in Table 4 , columns 2 and 3 (where peer-group performance is included as a control variable) with coefficients on Perf in Table 2, columns 5 and 6 (where peer-group performance is excluded as a control). 31 The column 2 coefficient on accrorG (0.856) is positive and significant and is in turn significantly higher than the corresponding coefficient in column 5 of Table 2 (coefficient = 0.491, p<.001). Similarly, in column 3 of Table 4 , the coefficient on accrorT (1.107) is positive and significant, as expected. Moreover, it is significantly higher than the corresponding coefficient (0.600) in column 6
of Table 2 (p<.001). 32 We also note that each of the coefficients on peer-group performance are significantly negative, as expected. 31 In defining peer-group performance missing data reduces the full sample size from 15,340 to 15,327 observations. In defining peer-group compensation, the sample size is further reduced to 14,514 observations. Finally, in the sub-sample analysis, the restriction of four observations per firm-specific regression reduces the total sample to 8,687 observations.
32 For completeness, in Table 4 Column 1 we present the coefficient on net performance with a control for peer-group performance, despite the fact that Proposition 2 does not imply a directional prediction for comparing the coefficients on net performance (i.e., with and without a control for peer-group performance). †
The inferences for the full sample are qualitatively identical for both the high and low correlation subsamples.
Again, the estimated PPS coefficient, , is predicted to be larger than the corresponding PPS coefficient when a control for peer-group performance is excluded, . As predicted, the coefficients based on gross performance in Table 4 , columns 4 to 7 (i.e., when controlling for peer-group gross performance) are significantly larger than the corresponding coefficients in Table 3 , columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 respectively (i.e., when a control for peer-group gross performance is excluded). The differences are statistically significant (p<.001).
Overall, the evidence provides strong support for Hypothesis H5; the estimated PPS when the researcher controls for peer performance exceeds the estimated PPS when the researcher does not control for peer performance. We interpret this finding as evidence that basing the PPS on gross performance and controlling for gross peer-group performance provides a less biased estimate of total effort incentives. In terms of economic significance in the case of excluding a control for peer-group performance, from Tables 1 and 2 from $165,000 to $505,000) in the change in compensation compared to the effect of a one-standard deviation change in a net accounting rate of return measure. Taken together these difference suggests that one reason for arguably weak incentives provided to CEOs (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ) could relate to the use of a net (instead of a gross) performance measure in the assessment of the pay-for-performance sensitivity.
Test of H6: High versus low correlation subsamples, controlling for peer-group performance
In this subsection, we test Hypothesis H6 using sub-samples defined by high and low correlation between focal firm and peer-group performance. In particular, we investigate the following H6 prediction: the estimated PPS coefficient when controlling for peer-group gross performance, , is predicted to be larger for high rather than low correlations (see the increasing effort incentives curve in Figure 1 ). 
The results are presented in columns 4 to 7 of Table 4 . We first note that the coefficients on peer-group performance are negative and in all but one case statistically significant. Next, we expect the coefficients on gross performance in columns 4 and 5 to be smaller than the respective coefficients in columns 6 and 7, respectively. The results in the four columns do not support the prediction -the variations are opposite to those expected. This could be for a number of reasons. For example, our sample size is reduced by up to 43% when we conduct the sub-sample analysis due to a requirement that a firm's peer-group has a minimum of four observations within its industry-size quartile. Because the loss in observations biases the coefficients in the low and high sub-samples, a possibility exists that our prediction remains valid in the population of observations but is not supported in the available sample of observations. In summary, our results in this sub-section generally do not support H6. We expected that total effort incentives would be upward sloping as a function of the correlation between the firm and peer-group performance.
We find the opposite in our sub-sample analysis. However, this lack of empirical support is potentially due to the unavoidable loss in data that arises from defining low and high correlation sub-samples.
Sensitivity checks
In untabulated analysis we perform several sensitivity checks, as follows.
(i) Agency models do not typically model the CEO pay variable as the natural logarithm of compensation.
However, empirical studies that employ (as a dependent variable) compensation levels will often transform the raw compensation levels variable using natural logarithm, particularly where a pay-performance elasticity (i.e., instead of sensitivity) is of interest to the researcher (Murphy 1999) . The advantage of the elasticity approach is that they produce a better "fit" between pay and performance in that performance typically explains more of the natural logarithm of CEO compensation than it does of raw CEO compensation.
Notwithstanding, we re-estimate our main regressions using a dependent variable of raw compensation instead of the natural logarithm of compensation to make the empirical estimation consistent with the theoretical construct. Our inferences are unchanged. In fact, in the re-estimated regressions, the coefficient on accounting performance becomes negative and insignificant, but adding back compensation makes the coefficients positive and significant. There is an increasing trend in the coefficient on performance when compensation is added back to the performance variable, consistent with Lemma 2 implications and the evidence reported in Section 5.3.
(ii) We include stock returns instead of accounting returns as the primary performance measure of interest. We then add scaled CEO compensation to the stock returns measure and the coefficient on performance is again significantly larger for the gross performance measure, as we expect. When we add back Top 5 executive compensation expense to stock returns performance, the coefficient on gross performance is significantly larger than the coefficient on net performance, again as we would expect. However, the coefficient on performance that excludes Top 5 executive compensation yields a lower coefficient than the coefficient on performance adding back only CEO compensation to stock returns performance. It is likely that adding back an accounting number (i.e., compensation) to a stock returns number will yield a noisy proxy for the true performance measures used in the CEO contract. Ideally, we would be able to add back the stock returns implication of compensation expense, but this cannot be disentangled easily.
(iii) As a check of the integrity of the estimations, we add random noise to either accounting or stock performance.
The resultant coefficients on gross performance are not significantly different from zero as we would expect (irrespective of whether we use as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of, or raw levels of, CEO compensation). In other words, simply increasing the variation in the performance variable does not mechanically increase the weight on that performance variable in the compensation regressions.
(iv) In December 2006, enterprises were required to apply SFAS123R and begin reporting the value of stock options as an expense on the income statement of the enterprise. In untabulated analysis, we show that (excluding standard economic controls) the coefficients on the gross performance variables are larger post-SFAS123R, which is consistent with the notion that the adjustment to performance is more relevant post-SFAS123R when the earnings number includes compensation expense that considers the value of stock options. However, when we include standard economic control variables in the regression, we find the opposite result: the coefficients on gross performance are smaller post-SFAS123R. The trend in the magnitude of the coefficients is consistent with our expectations both pre-and post-SFAS123R, (i.e, in ascending order: the coefficient on net performance, on net + CEO compensation, and on net + Top 5 compensation). However, likely because of differences in the timing of why enterprises adopted SFAS123R (i.e., creating noise in the measurement of SFAS123R adoption), comparing pre-and post-123R leads to unexpected lower coefficients on gross performance post-SFAS123R when we include standard economic determinants as controls.
(v) We partition the sample into two sub-samples containing firm years with non-negative net income (i.e., profit firms) and negative net income (i.e., loss firms), respectively. Consistent with prior work (Gaver and Gaver 1998), we find that the sensitivity of pay to performance is significantly stronger for profit firms than for loss firms. Moreover, consistent with H1 in our study, we find that the coefficient on net income is significantly increasing as compensation is added back to the performance variable in each of the profit and loss subsamples.
(vi) We use changes regressions instead of levels regressions for our main tests. Our inferences about the increasing trend in coefficients on performance after adding back (1) the change in CEO compensation and then (2) the change in Top 5 executive compensation to the change in net performance are the same as those when levels-based regressions are estimated (and reported in Section 5.3).
RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (RPE) BASED ON NET PERFORMANCE
This section illustrates how boards optimally aggregate net firm and peer performance measures and how associated empirical tests of relative performance evaluation are affected when the researcher uses net rather than gross performance.
Optimal aggregation of net performance measures
The optimal aggregation of performance measures differs significantly whether boards use net or gross performance. With gross performance, the ratio of optimal incentive rates, , minimizes compensation risk (Banker and Datar 1989) . In contrast, with net performance, peer performance is controllable by agent i, implying that the ratio of optimal incentive rates, , is not only driven by risk-filtering considerations. Rather, the optimal incentive ratio reflects that both net performance measures provide effort incentives. Hence, it can be optimal to place a relatively larger weight on net peer performance as compared with gross performance. Corollary 1 compares the optimal aggregation with net and gross performance.
Corollary 1: The optimal incentive ratio for agent i under net performance is given by . (i) The incentive ratio under net performance exceeds the incentive ratio under gross performance,
, with equality for either zero or perfect correlation, .
(ii) The signs of the incentive ratios are identical, .
Empirical implications
One key prediction of agency theory is that boards may consider a manager's relative performance to filter out common risk (Lambert 2001) . Given that the theory for RPE was developed for gross performance measures, † †
Corollary 1 suggests that using net performance measures might bias inferences from empirical RPE studies. The "strong" implication of the RPE hypothesis suggests that peer-related risk is perfectly eliminated from managerial compensation (Antle and Smith 1986) . Testing directly for strong-form RPE yields the following regression (Janakiraman et al. 1992 
where and denote regression coefficients. The left-hand side of regression (22) is given by the firm's choice to base managerial compensation on either net or gross performance, or , while the right-hand side is given by the researcher's choice of net or gross peer performance, or .
We first consider that the researcher uses gross peer performance in regression (22), i.e.,
. Since Lemma 1 (ii) ensures that the observed managerial compensation is identical under net and gross performance, , the estimated regression coefficient is not affected by whether managerial compensation is based on either net, , or gross performance, , yielding:
.
Irrespective of whether the firm bases managerial compensation on net or gross performance, evidence for strongform RPE is found if the associated estimated regression coefficient, , is not statistically different from zero, , i.e., there exists no correlation between managerial compensation and gross peer-performance.
Consistent with prior empirical studies on RPE, we next consider that the researcher uses net peer performance in regression (22), i.e., . According to Lemma 1
(ii), , the estimated regression coefficient is not affected by whether managerial compensation is based on either net, , or gross performance, , yielding: ,
where . With positive correlation, the compensation of the two agents is negatively correlated, indicating that a higher compensation for one agent is bad news for the other agent.
Expression (24) suggests that depends on key characteristics of the firms and managers in the economy.
Proposition 4 summarizes our results. 
Proposition 4 (Strong-form RPE Hypothesis): The researcher's test for strong-form RPE is not affected by
Managerial Compensation Peer Performance
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CONCLUSION
Prior empirical compensation studies typically consider net performance in estimating the relation between compensation and performance. In contrast, standard principal-agent theory is generally based on gross performance measures. Proposing a principal-agent model based on net performance measures, we theoretically analyze optimal managerial incentive rates and find that they substantially differ from "standard incentive rates" based on gross performance. Applying these results to an empirical-archival compensation context, we show that an empirical researcher is able to obtain an unbiased estimate of total effort incentives by including gross performance in the compensation regression and controlling for gross peer-group performance irrespective of whether the actual managerial compensation paid by firms is based on net or gross performance. On the other hand, if a researcher follows conventions in the empirical literature and considers net performance in a regression analysis designed to estimate total managerial effort incentives, then estimated incentives will be biased. The empirical analysis in our study provides evidence of such a bias; when considering net performance total effort incentives are underestimated. We interpret our empirical findings as consistent with prior work that has interpreted CEO incentives to be unexpectedly weak.
Similarly, in the context of the strong-form RPE hypothesis, considering gross instead of net performance matters. In contrast to the case of the regression coefficient on gross peer performance (i.e., if the coefficient is not significantly different from zero, the researcher can infer strong-form), we show that a researcher will find evidence supporting strong-form RPE only if the estimated regression coefficient on net peer performance is not significantly different from a benchmark that depends on characteristics of the economy (i.e., focal and peer firm characteristics).
This result and our empirical observation that compensation is a material component of net income together provide a potential rationale for why empirical studies based on net performance yields mixed strong-form RPE evidence.
Future research might explore whether considering gross performance in other contexts that make use of peers (e.g., the calculation of discretionary accruals) is of similar usefulness to researchers.
and completes this part of the proof.
(iv) Finally, we show for . The difference is given by:
First, we note that for and for .
We complete the proof by noting that is the only interior zero, and that the poles, , 
(ii) Denoting net performance with and using , the regression coefficient of (19) is given by:
which is zero for . Hence, we get: .
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) see Janakiraman et al. 1992. (ii) From (24), we get:
Finally,
Proof of Proposition 5. As outlined in the text. (1 ) (1 ) ( 
APPENDIX B: COMPARATIVE STATICS
This appendix reports comparative static results of the incentive rates for net performance measures.
Comparative statics are often used to structure empirical tests, i.e., researchers test whether incentive rates change with observable exogenous factors as predicted by theory (Garen 1994 and , and precisions, and , 36 For further discussion see Prendergast (2002) . 37 Broadly stated, the incentive rate on focal-firm net performance is negative if the agent receives a large fraction of the focal firm's gross payoff, e.g., if . Specifically, implies . Such values are typically not found in empirical studies. More generally, with net performance, both measures are controllable by the agent. Following Banker and Datar (1989) , the incentive ratio reflects the adjusted sensitivity of the signals, which can be negative for strong correlations. 38 However, since there exists a pole, the comparative statics only apply globally within each of the two regions, and but not for both regions together. The distinction between the two regions seems to be primarily theoretical.
( The result shows that the comparative statics of the incentive intensity principle with gross performance also apply when compensation is based on net performance. Further, the result highlights that a manager's incentive rate for net performance varies in a predictable way with the characteristics of other managers, e.g., managers in the same industry.
The following result provides new comparative static insights about the optimal incentive ratio when compensation is based on net performance, highlighting that the optimal ratio varies in a predictable way with characteristics of other managers: (14) as Applying for and and using the chain rule gives for
(1 ) 1 (1 ) .
(1 ) 1 (1 ) The parties acknowledge that the Company's audited financial statements might not be available when the annual bonuses under Section 3.2 and 3.3 above are to be calculated and paid. In that event the annual bonus will initially be calculated and paid on the basis of the Company's internal statements for the Bonus Year. If the amount of the bonus ultimately determined to be due for any Bonus Year on the basis of the Company's audited financial statements differs from the bonus that was initially paid for such Bonus Year, Stonecipher shall promptly refund the amount of any excess, or the Company shall promptly pay Stonecipher an additional amount equal to any deficiency.
Executive Employment Agreement at Lionbridge Technologies, 2008
The pre-established Revenue Growth and Profitability targets and the threshold achievement for payment of such targets for the MIP in 2008 were as follows:
• Revenue Target: $477 Million. The threshold for payment of this component is achievement of at least 95% of the Revenue Target, or $454 Million.
• Profitability Target: $34.8 Million, based on the Company's earnings before interest, taxes depreciation, amortization, restructuring costs, stock based compensation charges and other one-time events. The threshold for payment of this component is achievement of at least 80% of the Profitability Target, or $27.8 Million accrorT=accrorN + [Top 5 Executives' total compensation ÷ (seq × 1,000)]; impact = tdc1 ÷ (seq × 1,000), as a proportion of accror; impactT5 = tdc1 for the firm's top 5 executives ÷ (seq × 1,000), as a proportion of accrorN; lntotal = natural logarithm of tdc1; ln_mve_1 = lagged natural logarithm of the market value of equity; tobinsq_1 = lagged (market value of equity + the book value of debt) ÷ total assets; mktror_i = annual stock returns lagged by i periods, i = 1, 2; accror_i = accrorN lagged by i periods, i = 1, 2; sdret = standard deviation of daily stock returns; lntenure = natural logarithm of the number of years since the CEO was appointed; startage = CEO's age in years on the first day of appointment; outside = 1 if the CEO joined the firm within one year of being appointed CEO, 0 otherwise; founder = 1 if the CEO either founded or co-founded the firm, 0 otherwise; reg = equals 1 if the firm is in a regulated industry, i.e., SIC 4900 to SIC 4939, and zero otherwise; pmedianN = median accrorN of peers in the same 2 digit SIC and size quartile; pmedianG = median accrorG of peers in the same 2 digit SIC and size quartile. pmedianT = median accrorT of peers in the same 2 digit SIC and size quartile. Table 1. ***, **, and * represent significance levels, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed). Pooled estimation using Froot's (1989) robust standard errors, clustered by firm, is used to compute z-statistics, which are reported in parentheses.
---------Low Correlation Subsample-------------High Correlation Subsample-------- ***, **, and * represent significance levels, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed). Pooled estimation using Froot's (1989) robust standard errors, clustered by firm, is used to compute z-statistics, which are reported in parentheses.
